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Whenever a legislature creates a technology-specific rime, it faces a num-
ber of challenges. First, there is a risk that the new statute will merely dupli-
cate existing crimes, thus over criminalizing the conduct and creating
unnecessary confusion. Second, the legislature needs to ensure that it provides
the proper guidance to prosecutors, citizens, and courts regarding the new
concepts in the criminal statute. And finally, the legislature needs to ensure
that the law can be amended and updated as the technology evolves.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") is an example of a tech-
nology-specific riminal statute that fails all of these tests. Much of the CFAA
is comprised of fraud, extortion, and theft provisions which prohibit conduct
already covered by existing laws (or could be covered through minor changes
to those laws). The only truly unique aspects of the CFAA are the concepts of
"access" and "trespass," while other terms, such as "loss," "damage," and
"authorization," need to be given specific meanings in the context of computer
misuse. Unfortunately, the CFAA fails to adequately define any of these
terms. And although Congress has amended the CFAA numerous times over
the past thirty years, it has still been unable to keep up with the fast pace of
technological change in this area.
The best solution to this problem is for Congress to stop trying to regulate
computer misuse directly through legislation, and instead empower an admin-
istrative agency to set more detailed and technical rules. An administrative
agency would have a number of advantages over legislatures and courts be-
cause it could develop and apply expertise in setting rules, generate and en-
force separate rules for civil and criminal liability, respond quickly in creating




* Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer Professor for the Administration of Justice & Rule of
Law, Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University. The Author would like to thank
Angela Lloyd, Matthew Klugman, Michael J. Madison, Michael Levy, and the other participants
in the Symposium for their comments and feedback on this Article. Also, thanks to Sara Coulter
for excellent help tracking down sources. And finally, thanks to Orin Kerr and The George
Washington Law Review for sponsoring the Symposium.
December 2016 Vol. 84 No. 6
1703
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
I. THE NEED FOR "COMPUTER-SPECIFIC" CRIMES ........ 1706
II. GRADING THE CFAA........................ 1711
III. A NEW WAY FORWARD: ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION OF COMPUTER MISUSE ................... 1714
CONCLUSION ................................................... 1722
INTRODUCTION
New technology frequently enables new criminal activity. The in-
vention of the telephone led to wiretapping, while the invention of the
automobile led to driving while intoxicated. Frequently, however, the
"new" crime being committed with novel technology is merely a dif-
ferent version of an existing crime that has already been illegal for
decades or even centuries.' Given time, police, prosecutors, and
courts will use pre-existing traditional criminal laws to address this
new criminal activity. Unfortunately, legislatures eager to keep the
criminal code "current" often respond by passing new (and unneces-
sary) laws to ensure the new crimes are covered.
This legislative overreaction produces a number of negative con-
sequences. Technology-specific crimes unnecessarily expand and
complicate the criminal code.2 They can also lead to overbroad or
ambiguous laws as legislatures scramble to cover all possible harmful
activity associated with a new technology before they truly understand
how the technology is used and how it impacts society. Also, the new
technology's swift evolution means that any law prohibiting a particu-
lar use of that technology must be updated frequently. Legislatures,
however, do not always act swiftly and rarely have the technical ex-
pertise to understand how the technology is evolving.3
Thus, when a new technology is used to facilitate crime, legisla-
tures should engage in a two-step process. First, the legislature must
1 For example, before the automobile was widespread, most states had statutes prohibit-
ing reckless endangerment, which could have been interpreted (or slightly amended) to encom-
pass reckless driving. See DUI: CRIME AND CONSEQ. IN TENN. § 14:12 (2015-2016 ed.), Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2015) (stating that Tennessee's reckless driving statute requires the use
of a vehicle while felony reckless endangerment does not; however, a motor vehicle can be con-
sidered a deadly weapon, which means that a defendant can be prosecuted under either offense).
2 See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 747, 755 (2005) (noting the "unprecedented ex-
pansion of the federal criminal code in recent years"); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Polit-
ics of Criminal Law, 100 MIcH. L. REV. 505, 513-14 (2001) (noting the increase in the Illinois
Criminal Code from 131 crimes in 1856 to 421 in 2000).
3 See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 306
(1990) (stating that "[a]gencies have the technical expertise and knowledge, which courts and
legislatures often lack, to evaluate the 'workability' of statutes").
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ask whether there is anything truly unique about the criminal activity
being committed with the new technology. If the conduct is already
covered by existing law, the legislature need not create a new criminal
statute,4 although it may need to add a new term or broaden a defini-
tion in the existing law.5 Second, if the conduct is not covered, the
legislature should determine the best way to develop a new criminal
prohibition and maintain its relevance in the face of rapidly changing
technology. Frequently, the best option is not to pass a new criminal
statute, but instead to delegate the role to an administrative agency.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), 6 which Con-
gress passed in the 1980s7 in response to the growing use and abuse of
computers, provides an illustrative example of this phenomenon. This
Article uses the CFAA as a case study by examining which parts of
the CFAA were necessary to respond to new crimes, and by demon-
strating that the CFAA has failed to keep pace as computers have
become more sophisticated and ubiquitous, and as society's norms in
relation to those computers transform. This Article concludes that
most of the provisions in the CFAA are an unnecessary duplication of
existing crimes, while the few necessary provisions have failed to pro-
vide appropriate guidance to courts. Thus, the CFAA represents a
classic example of legislative overreaction to crimes committed using
an emerging technology.
4 For example, many states have a criminal law prohibiting both reckless endangerment
and reckless driving even though the behavior forbidden by the reckless driving statute is fre-
quently already covered by the reckless endangerment statute. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-222 (West 1990) (reckless driving), with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-63 (West 1971)
(reckless endangerment).
5 For example, the development and use of credit cards enabled criminals to steal credit
card numbers and other intangible items of value so some jurisdictions responded by creating an
entirely new crime to cover theft of credit cards, see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-192 (West
1975), however, other jurisdictions found there was nothing particularly distinct about these
thefts other than the fact that the item being stolen was intangible so they responded by merely
broadening the definition of "property" in their existing theft statutes, see, e.g., UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-6-401(1) (West 1973) ("'Property' means anything of value, including ... intangible
personal property.").
6 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
7 Technically, the CFAA was passed in 1986, but the first federal crimes with regard to
computer misuse were included in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. See Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CADCFAA) of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 (2012)). The 1986 Act updated and broadened the criminal liability that Congress first set
out in 1984. See CFAA of 1986, 100 Stat. 1213.
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Part I of this Article evaluates the provisions of the CFAA, con-
cluding that only the "damages" and "trespass" aspects of the CFAA
are necessary. Part II argues that Congress failed to define these new
terms properly, leading to confusion in the courts and instances of
abuse by prosecutors. Finally, Part III explores the possibility of using
an administrative agency to promulgate rules prohibiting "computer
misuse" more effectively than Congress has done with the CFAA.
I. THE NEED FOR "COMPUTER-SPECIFIC" CRIMES
When new technologies create new opportunities for criminal be-
havior, legislatures have four possible ways to respond: (1) do nothing,
(2) make minor changes to existing laws, (3) enhance the punishment
if the new technology is used in committing the crime, or (4) create an
entirely new crime.
In many cases, the legislature need not do anything at all because
the existing criminal laws cover the new criminal behavior. A nine-
teenth century statute prohibiting murder can be used to prosecute a
killer in the twenty-first century, even if the modern criminal used a
weapon that had not existed at the time the statute was written. Simi-
larly, a person who engages in fraud over the telephone can be con-
victed under fraud statutes passed before telephones were invented.
In some cases, the legislature may need to make minor changes to
a criminal statute to ensure that the technology-enabled criminal ac-
tivity is covered. Aggravated assault statutes may define "assault with
a deadly weapon," and then provide a list of weapons that are in-
cluded.8 The emergence of new weapons such as Taser guns or pepper
spray will force a legislature to amend the definition of "deadly
weapon" in order to remove any ambiguity about whether the new
weapons are covered.9
In other situations, the legislature may believe that committing an
existing crime using a new technology makes the crime more severe
and thus deserving of greater punishment. For example, a legislature
may decide that harassment over the telephone causes more social
harm than face-to-face harassment, and thus create a new statute that
enhances the punishment when a telephone is used.'0
8 See, e.g., Omuo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (West 2011) (felonious assault); Omuo REV.
CODE AN. § 2923.11(A) (West 2015) (defining "deadly weapon").
9 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Dangerous Weapons § 4-101(a)(3)(i) (West 2016) (defining
"pepper mace").
10 Compare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20 (McKinney 1967) (threatening someone in
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Finally, there are some cases in which the legislature decides that
an entirely new law is required because the technology enables a new
form of criminal activity which is unregulated by existing criminal
laws. For example, the invention of the automobile enabled the crime
of driving while intoxicated. In theory, legislatures could have done
nothing and allowed the broader crime of reckless endangerment o
cover this activity." However, the particular aspects of the crime-
which include setting out specific levels of blood alcohol to determine
whether a crime occurred and the degree of the infraction-meant
that a new statute was required.12
Some commentators13 and legislatorsl4 believe computer crime
fits into this last category. Over thirty years ago, when Congress in-
serted the first computer crime provisions in the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act,15 its primary purpose was to ensure that prosecu-
tors had the necessary tools to combat computer crime.1 6 Specifically,
Congress stated the criminal justice system was "bound by traditional
legal machinery which in many cases may be ineffective against un-
person with the intent to harass is a mere violation), with N.Y. PENAL LAw§ 240.30 (McKinney
1967) (threatening a person over the telephone with intent to harass is a class A misdemeanor).
11 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-103(a) (West 2016) ("A person commits an offense
who recklessly engages in conduct that places or may place another person in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily injury.").
12 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-401 (West 2016).
13 See, e.g., Carol R. Williams, Note, A Proposal for Protecting Privacy During the Infor-
mation Age, 11 ALAsKA L. REV. 119, 119 (1994) ("While conventional criminal statutes can be
used against certain misues [sic] of computer resources, most do not address the difficulties of
safeguarding computerized data.").
14 In addition to the CFAA on the federal level, every one of the fifty states has its own
computer crime statute. Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don't They? An
Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171, 181 n.60 (2000).
15 See CADCFAA of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
16 See H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 8-9 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3694-95.
The legislative history also mentions a secondary purpose: to ensure that computer crimes would
be taken seriously and not dismissed as mere "intellectual pranksterism." Id. at 11, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3696. As the House Report noted, "[p]eople can relate to mugging a little
old lady and taking her pocketbook, but the perception is that perhaps there is not something so
wrong about taking information by use of a device called a computer even if it costs the economy
millions now and potentially billions in the future." Id. at 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3697. Today, this justification has become obsolete. Public awareness and anxiety about com-
puter crime is now widespread as the vast majority of Americans now store and transfer sensitive
information via computers, and large-scale computer viruses and computer theft have been well-
publicized and have personally impacted millions of users. See Steve Durbin, Cybercrime: The
Next Entrepreneurial Growth Business?, WIRED (Oct. 2014), http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/
10/cybercrime-growth-business/.
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conventional criminal operations."17 For example, traditional criminal
statutes prohibiting larceny were thought to be insufficient in the com-
puter-crime context because the property stolen from a computer may
exist "only in the form of magnetic impulses" and the person from
whom the property is stolen usually still retains a copy.18 Congress
echoed these concerns two years later in 1986 when it expanded fed-
eral jurisdiction over computer crimes by enacting the CFAA. 19 For
example, the Senate report noted that "[t]he proliferation of com-
puters and computer data has spread before the nation's criminals a
vast array of property that, in many cases, is wholly unprotected
against crime." 20
A few commentators disagree, arguing that pre-existing criminal
laws could have been used to prosecute any of the conduct forbidden
by the CFAA. Professor Joseph Olivenbaum has criticized the "com-
puter-specific" approach taken by the CFAA and advocated for a
more traditional "harm-centered" approach in which the focus of the
legislation is on deterring and punishing harmful conduct, not on the
tool the suspect used to cause the harm.21 According to Professor
17 H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3695.
18 Id.
19 CFAA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 (2012)).
20 S. REP. No. 99-432, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2480. The legisla-
tive history of the CFAA also shows that Congress wanted to ensure uniform federal jurisdiction
over crimes committed with a computer. Prior to the CADCFAA, the federal government only
obtained jurisdiction of such crimes if the defendant placed a communication across interstate
lines during the commission of the crime (thus providing jurisdiction through the wire-fraud
statute). H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3691-92. Since much of
the illicit activity involving computers in the mid-1980s did not use interstate communication,
enforcement of these crimes was often left to state criminal computer crime statutes, if they
existed. Given the global reach of the Internet, the vast majority of modern computer crimes
involve some kind of interstate connection, thus rendering this purpose of the CFAA obsolete.
Although Congress claimed to be taking quick and preemptive action by identifying and ad-
dressing problems arising out of an emerging technology, its response to the emergence of com-
puter crime was relatively slow. Computers had been used to commit crimes-some of them
very serious-long before Congress or even the states began their efforts to create computer-
specific criminal laws. See Richard C. Hollinger & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Process of
Criminalization: The Case of Computer Crime Laws, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 101, 116 & n.8 (1988)
(noting a significant "temporal lag" between the emergence of computer crimes and the promul-
gation of computer-specific criminal laws while criminal activity that arose out of other new
technologies (such as the invention of designer drugs or the use of automobiles in crimes)
brought a much faster legislative response).
21 Joseph M. Olivenbaum, <CTRL> <ALT> <DEL>: Rethinking Federal Computer Crime
Legislation, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 574, 641-42 (1997) (arguing that the CFAA's computer-
specific approach results in an unnecessary and overbroad statute because it criminalizes con-
duct that would not be criminal if the defendant were not using a computer).
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Olivenbaum, all of what the CFAA prohibited could already be cov-
ered by traditional criminal statutes.22 Similarly, Professor Susan
Brenner has argued that there was nothing distinct about crimes com-
mitted with computers; even if the crime took place entirely in the
virtual world, it was still analogous to a traditional crime like trespass
or burglary.23 A few years after the CFAA was passed, two prominent
criminologists argued that the entire purpose of the law (and its state
counterparts) was symbolic because "in many instances [the new laws]
merely transformed existing criminal activity involving computers into
'computer crime." '24
Professors Olivenbaum and Brenner are partially correct: many
of the provisions of the CFAA merely copied language from pre-ex-
isting federal laws. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) combines the
language of the existing federal fraud statute with the element of "ac-
cess[ing] a protected computer without authorization, or [by] ex-
ceed[ing] authorized access,"25 while § 1030(a)(7)(A) and (C) prohibit
extortion through threatening to damage a computer,26 a crime al-
ready covered by federal extortion laws.2 7 In other words, much of
the conduct prohibited by the CFAA is also covered by other federal
criminal provisions, meaning that the CFAA merely provides an addi-
tional charge for prosecutors to bring if the defendant used a com-
puter while committing the crime.28
However, there are two provisions of the CFAA that do not have
any analogue in traditional federal crimes. The first is § 1030(a)(5),
which criminalizes causing damage through "transmission of a pro-
gram" or after "access[ing] a protected computer without authoriza-
tion." 29 The second is § 1030(a)(2)(C), the anti-hacking provision,
which criminalizes "intentionally access[ing] a computer without au-
22 Id. at 641.
23 Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as "Virtual Crime"?, 4 CAL. CRIM. L. REv. 1,
It 77-86 (2001) ("[lIt is conceptually irrelevant whether the location that is unlawfully accessed
exists in the physical world or in the virtual world; the harm to the owner of that area is logically
indistinguishable.").
24 Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 20, at 116-17 (noting that the proliferation of
computer-specific crimes on the state level went against the general trend to simplify and consol-
idate criminal codes, and that states could have accomplished the same result through "minor
definitional amendments to preexisting criminal laws").
25 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012).
26 Id. § 1030(a)(7)(A), (C).
27 See id. § 875(d), 1951. Another example is § 1030(a)(6) which prohibits trafficking in
passwords, conduct which is also prohibited by § 1029 (access device fraud). See id. §§ 1029,
1030(a)(6).
28 See Olivenbaum, supra note 21, at 624-41.
29 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5). Some of this conduct is prohibited by § 1362, which prohibits
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thorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby ob-
tain[ing] . . . information from any protected computer."30 This
provision essentially criminalizes any unauthorized or exceeded access
to a computer because a "protected computer" is defined as any com-
puter "used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or commu-
nication," and anytime a person gains such access, she will usually
"obtain[ ] information." 31
In other words, § 1030(a)(5) focuses on "damage" that can be
done in the virtual world, while § 1030(a)(2)(C) focuses on "trespass"
in the virtual world.3 2 Unlike fraud, extortion, or theft, the concepts
of computer "damage" and "trespass" do not translate easily from ex-
isting criminal statutes which are meant to apply to the analog world.
To be sure, the federal criminal code does contain a number of
criminal damage and trespass statutes. For example, § 1361 prohibits
"willfully injur[ing] or commit[ting] any depredation against any prop-
erty of the United States."33 The terms "injure" and "commit depre-
dation" are not defined in the statute, though courts have interpreted
them to mean any actual physical damage or destruction of both real
and personal property.4 But computer crimes rarely involve physical
damage or destruction, and so measuring "damage" in the virtual
world is difficult. Sometimes, data that is destroyed can easily be re-
stored from a backup, making the actual amount of damage hard to
calculate. On the other hand, some forms of computer crime (such as
denial of service attacks) may not damage any data at all, but merely
cause it to be unavailable for a period of time, and thereby cause a
significant loss to its owner. And the mere fact that a system has been
accessed without authorization could force a company to spend signif-
icant resources to ensure that no data has been compromised and to
prevent future attacks, which might (or might not) be measured as
"damage" under traditional statutes.
These problems are even more severe with regard to "trespass-
ing" in the digital world. Federal trespass statutes bear no relation-
willful interference with government communication systems, but the CFAA provision is much
broader. Id. § 1362.
30 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
31 See id. § 1030(a)(2)(C), (e)(2)(B).
32 See id. § 1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(5).
33 Id. § 1361.
34 See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 554 F.2d 783, 785-86 (6th Cir. 1977). The court noted
that this includes "the act or an instance of robbing, plundering, or laying waste"-a colorful
description which is nonetheless rather unhelpful when applied to the digital context. Id. at 786.
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ship to the act of "entering" a computer without authorization.35 It is
relatively easy to define the point at which an individual enters or
remains on real property without permission, but in the virtual world,
the concepts of "entry" and "without permission" become much more
difficult to define. Does a potential hacker "enter" a computer when
she views the homepage of a website, or when she enters a password
on the website, or only when she accesses an area of the website that
is not generally available to the public? And does the hacker lack
"permission" if she merely violates the terms of service of the website
or enters a valid password belonging to someone else? None of the
common law of traditional trespass will help in resolving these
questions.
Thus, although much of the CFAA was unnecessary, there were
at least two areas in which legislative action was necessary to respond
to computer-specific crimes-computer "damage" and "trespass."
Unfortunately, Congress did a poor job in crafting its response, lead-
ing to confusion in the courts.
II. GRADING THE CFAA
As noted above, creating technology-specific crimes can serve an
important purpose if the law covers new types of activities not effec-
tively covered by existing traditional criminal prohibitions. In its orig-
inal 1984 computer crime legislation, Congress attempted to address
these problems by outlawing "unauthorized access" and "exceeding
authorized access" to a computer that obtained classified or financial
information, or used, modified, destroyed, or disclosed information
that would affect the federal government-that is, it only focused on
the crimes of "computer damage" and "computer trespass."36 Thus,
Congress's original computer crime legislation succeeded in focusing
on two new legal concepts relating to computer crime that had not
been sufficiently defined in the then-existing criminal code.
Unfortunately, this original legislation neglected to define the
terms "authorization" and "access," or explain what it meant by
"us[ing], modif[ying], destroy[ing], or disclos[ing] information,"3 7 and
thus failed to meet its intended purpose of updating the criminal code
35 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1863 (2012) (prohibiting trespass into national forests); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2278a (2012) (prohibiting trespass into federally regulated facilities); 36 C.F.R. § 2.31 (2015)
(prohibiting trespass into national parks).
36 See CADCFAA of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190-92 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
37 See id.; SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERCRIME AND THE LAW: CHALLENGES, ISSUES, AND
OurcoMEs 24-25 (2012) (noting that the CADCFAA defined only the term "computer").
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in response to technological changes. This arguably left the situation
worse than it was prior to the legislation's passage. Using a computer
to cause damage or accessing a computer without authorization and
obtaining information were now federal crimes, but neither the courts,
prosecutors, nor everyday citizens were informed exactly what type of
conduct was prohibited.
When the law was amended two years later, Congress again failed
to provide any definitions for these terms, 38 and then compounded its
mistake by adding the crimes of computer fraud and trafficking in
computer passwords which were duplicative of existing laws.3 9
It was not until 1996-twelve years after the original legislation
was passed-that Congress finally defined the term "damage" in the
computer context.40 "Damage" was defined as "any impairment to
the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or informa-
tion" that "causes loss aggregating at least $5000 in value during any
1-year period"41-a particularly broad definition considering nearly
any instance of unauthorized hacking could be said to impair the in-
tegrity of a computer system. Although this definition provided much
needed (and overdue) guidance to courts and prosecutors, it raised
the new question of how to calculate "loss" in the context of computer
crime. After some litigation on this question, Congress amended the
CFAA yet again in 2001 to define "loss" as "any reasonable cost to
any victim," including the cost of assessing damage and lost revenue
due to interrupted service.42 This definition is also quite broad consid-
ering nearly any amount of damage to even a small company could
easily reach the statutory threshold, especially given the fact that the
38 See generally CFAA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, sec. 2(g), § 1030(e), 100 Stat. 1213,
1215 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
39 See CFAA, sec. 2(d), § 1030(a)(4), (6). Congress apparently added these two new
crimes, as well as expanded the criminal damaging provision, at the request of the Department
of Justice, which was seeking new tools to combat computer crime. BRENNER, supra note 37, at
25.
40 National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, sec.
201(4)(D), § 1030(e)(8), 110 Stat. 3491, 3493 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
41 Id. Damage less than $5000 could also give rise to felony liability if it modified or
impaired medical care, caused physical injury, or threatened public safety. Id. Later amend-
ments created felony liability if the damage affected a United States government computer used
for "the administration of justice, national defense, or national security," or if the "damage af-
fect[ed] 10 or more protected computers." See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i).
42 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 814(d)(5),
§ 1030(e)(11), 115 Stat. 272, 384 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) (codifying the definition
of "loss" used in United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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dollar amount has not been updated for inflation since it was origi-
nally set nearly twenty years ago.43
However belated and overbroad these definitions of "computer
damage" may be, they are certainly preferable to Congress's treat-
ment of the terms "exceeds authorized access" and "without authori-
zation." The CFAA defines "exceeds authorized access" as
"access[ing] a computer with authorization and [using] such access to
obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not
entitled so to obtain or alter,"" but the statute fails to define the term
"authorization" or "access."45 Professor Orin Kerr has argued that, at
the time Congress passed the CFAA, it probably did not realize how
complex these concepts were (and would become) in the computer
context, resulting in a startling level of ambiguity.46 Writing in 2003,
Professor Kerr noted that the way individuals used computers in the
1970s made it relatively easy to determine whether another computer
was being "accessed."47 The user had to dial into another computer
and then enter a username and password to communicate with it; thus,
"[w]hile the concept of access may have made sense given 1975 com-
puter technology, the technology of 2003 presents a different case."4
This problem has only grown more severe in 2016 with the widespread
use of cloud computing and the proliferation of apps on smart phones
that automatically and sometimes continuously connect to the In-
ternet. Similarly, Congress's failure to define the term "authoriza-
tion" has led to wildly inconsistent applications of the term.49
In short, although Congress's primary purpose in creating a com-
puter-specific law was to tackle the novel issues that arise in the
unique context of computer crime, Congress has consistently failed to
provide this guidance. The problem is not due to legislative neglect:
Congress has amended the CFAA eight times since 1986,50 and has
still failed to fulfill this primary purpose.
43 $5000 in 2016 is only about $3300 in 1996 dollars. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTIcs, http://www.bis.gov/datalinflation-calculator.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2016).
44 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
45 See generally id. § 1030.
46 See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1616-17 (2003).
47 Id. at 1641.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., id. at 1643-44 (arguing for a "code-based" definition of "without authoriza-
tion"); David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating: Reconstructing the CFAA Intent Re-
quirement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 945-46 (2013) (arguing that the CFAA should
be amended to increase the mens rea requirement for unauthorized access).
50 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMEs 2 (2010).
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Congress's failure to resolve these questions has led to confusion
in the courts which have issued widely varied interpretations of key
terms in the statute. For example, there is currently a circuit split as to
whether or not an employee violates the CFAA if she is authorized to
use a database for certain purposes (e.g., work related purposes) but
instead uses the database for other purposes (e.g., personal use or to
help a competitor).51 Furthermore, most of the caselaw surrounding
the CFAA has been generated in the context of civil suits. This raises
the concern that courts will interpret the language of the statute
broadly in the civil context, and then the broad interpretation will
have precedential value in future criminal cases.5 2 Conversely, there is
concern that courts will interpret the language too narrowly in civil
cases because they are concerned about the use of their holdings in
future criminal cases.53 Overall, the CFAA has failed to provide ade-
quate guidance to courts, and thus has failed to effectively establish
what constitutes "computer misuse."
III. A NEW WAY FORWARD: ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
OF COMPUTER MISUSE
Another way to address a new type of criminal activity (especially
one that is based on evolving technology) is to empower an adminis-
trative agency to create rules regulating the activity. Administrative
agencies have a number of advantages over legislatures and courts be-
cause they can develop and apply expertise in setting rules, generate
and enforce separate rules for civil and criminal liability, respond
quickly in creating or changing rules in response to changing condi-
tions, and be insulated from political pressures.
51 Compare LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1130-34 (9th Cir. 2009) (ap-
plying a narrow view of liability and holding that an employee is still "authorized" to use an
employer's computer even if he uses the computer contrary to the employer's interest), and
Univ. Sports Publ'ns Co. v. Playmakers Media Co., 725 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(holding same and discussing circuit split), with Int'l Airport Ctrs. LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418,
420-21 (7th Cir. 2006) (adopting a broad view of liability and holding that an employee who
accesses a computer in a way that breaches her duty of loyalty to her employer loses her "au-
thorization" to access the computer), and EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577,
581-84 (1st Cir. 2001) (adopting a broad view of liability and holding that an employee who
accesses a computer in a way that breaches her confidentiality agreement violates the CFAA by
"exceed[ing] authorized access").
52 See Kerr, supra note 46, at 1599, 1642.
53 See, e.g., Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134-35 (noting that the court's interpretation of the
CFAA in the civil case is "equally applicable in the criminal context" and that the rule of lenity
should apply for all criminal cases).
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Congress has turned to administrative agencies to create and
maintain criminal rules in a number of other contexts. In some con-
texts (such as the regulation of financial crimes by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC")), Congress sets out broad principles
to guide the agency's actions54 and then delegates to that agency the
power to promulgate rules pursuant to those principles.55 In other
contexts (such as the regulation of controlled substances by the Drug
Enforcement Agency), Congress creates specific criminal prohibitions
but allows administrative agencies to keep those prohibitions current
by filling in certain details.5 6 Generally, Congress chooses this route
when the regulated activity is complex or rapidly evolving, thus mak-
ing the regulation more appropriate for administrative agencies.
Another advantage of using an administrative structure is that an
agency can more easily differentiate between civil and criminal viola-
tions, and create different definitions and degrees of punishment for
each. If an administrative agency takes over all civil and criminal en-
forcement of computer misuse, the agency could create a more sophis-
ticated framework of regulation that segregates language and
definitions into each side.
54 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (recognizing that Congress may
"obtain[ ] the assistance of its coordinate Branches" in establishing law because with "our in-
creasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives").
55 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) ("It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.") (emphasis added). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and provides for criminal penalties for violat-
ing SEC rules or regulations. Id § 78d, ff(a). Another example is the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, which created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA"). See 29 U.S.C. § 655 (2012) (allowing the Secretary of Labor to promulgate rules
relating to worker safety); id. § 666(e) (providing criminal penalties for violations of those rules).
56 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 creates criminal
penalties for possessing or trafficking certain substances but then allows the Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA") to list which drugs are regulated and to what degree. See 21 U.S.C. § 811
(2012) (giving the Attorney General (and DEA) the power to add or remove substances from
the various schedules of controlled substances in the law). Another example is the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 which prohibits interfering with any species on the endangered species list,
but then gives various agencies the power to place (or remove) species from that list. See 16
U.S.C. § 1533 (2012) (allowing the relevant administrative agencies to designate specific species
as endangered); id. § 1538 (prohibiting any interference with the species contained on the endan-
gered species list). Also, the federal government prohibits giving support to terrorist organiza-
tions and then relies on an administrative agency to designate which organizations are "terrorist
organizations." See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012).
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How would the agency operate in practice? The first step would
be to pass enabling legislation to delegate rulemaking power and
guide the agency. The courts have set surprisingly few limits on this
process, allowing Congress to delegate criminal rulemaking power to
an administrative agency as long as the enabling statute provides an
"intelligible principle" to guide and limit the discretion of the
agency.57 The Supreme Court has provided multiple examples of such
"intelligible principles," such as authorizing the War Department to
recover "excessive profits" earned on military contracts5 8 the Price
Administrator to fix "fair and equitable" commodities prices,59 the
Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing
in the "public interest,"60 and the Drug Enforcement Agency to place
new drugs on the prohibited drug schedules if they posed an "immi-
nent hazard to the public safety."61
Given these relatively broad grants of authority, administrative
delegation for computer trespass cases would certainly be feasible. In
fact, the current text of the CFAA would be a good starting point:
Congress could direct the appropriate agency to promulgate rules to
punish "[w]hoever intentionally accesses a computer without authori-
zation or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains ... informa-
tion from any protected computer."62 The agency would then draft
rules specifically explaining what is meant by "access" and "authoriza-
tion," and could set different levels of punishment (both civil and
criminal) for different types of prohibited activity.63 For example,
merely viewing information without interacting with the protected
computer may constitute one level of punishment, while entering a
password or directing the computer to carry out a command would
lead to a higher level of punishment. Likewise, an agency could create
57 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991).
58 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 774-87 (1948).
59 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426-27 (1944).
60 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
61 Touby, 500 U.S. at 165. The Court suggested in Touby that there may be a higher
standard for administrative regulations that create criminal penalties, but in the case of criminal-
izing designer drugs, it held that any higher standard was met by further guidance given by the
statute which also directed the agency to consider "the drug's 'history and current pattern of
abuse'; '[t]he scope, duration, and significance of abuse'; and '[w]hat, if any, risk there is to the
public health."' Id. at 166.
62 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012).
63 Like the Environmental Protection Agency, the agency handling computer misuse
would have rulemaking power and the ability to handle administrative hearings, but would leave
civil and criminal enforcement of its rules to the Department of Justice. See U.S. ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT BASIC INFORMATION (2016), http://www.epa.gov/en
forcement/enforcement-basic-information.
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less severe (perhaps merely civil) penalties for individuals whose ac-
cess is "unauthorized" or "exceeds authorization" because they vio-
late terms-of-service provisions or employer restrictions on employee
computer use (what Professor Kerr terms "contract-based theories of
authorization"),6 but more severe criminal penalties when such access
involves "tricking" the violated computer by hacking into its code or
entering a false password (so-called "code-based restrictions").65
The administrative agency would also be able to update its rules
as technology evolves. Currently, every time computer hackers em-
ploy new tactics or use a new technology, prosecutors must go to Con-
gress to request amendments to the CFAA. Within the next ten years,
the concept of "access" or "computer" may change even more dra-
matically than it has in the last thirty years, requiring new definitions
for these terms, or perhaps an entirely new regulatory structure. The
definition of "authorization" may also need to be updated as new
forms of interacting with third-party computers come into existence-
just as the rise of email, social media websites, and cloud data storage
have changed the ways we interact with computers. Future technolog-
ical advances will create new ambiguities that we cannot yet even im-
agine-ambiguities that will be far better addressed by the expertise,
speed, and political neutrality of an administrative agency rather than
by Congress.
Most importantly, an administrative agency could anticipate spe-
cific types of computer trespass and assign the appropriate level of
criminal liability for each situation. For example, consider the various
scenarios discussed in Matthew Kugler's paper in this Symposium.66
Kugler surveyed nineteen different scenarios, almost all of which in-
volved some form of "unauthorized access" or "exceeding authorized
access."67 The survey respondents believed there should be signifi-
cantly different levels of liability based on slight differences in the
facts of the case.68 For example, respondents believed that breaking
into a secured Wi-Fi and looking at the files on the victim's iTunes
64 Kerr, supra note 46, at 1649.
65 Id. An administrative agency could also create different regulations for civil cases and
thus segregate the civil and criminal law for computer trespass cases. Currently, most of the
litigation surrounding the CFAA is brought by civil litigants, and so courts interpret the terms of
the statute in the context of a civil case. Oftentimes this will result in definitions that are appro-
priate for assigning civil liability but too broad for criminal cases.




THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
account was significantly less blameworthy than breaking into a se-
cured Wi-Fi and looking at the general files on the victim's com-
puter.69 The CFAA does not distinguish between many of these
different scenarios.70 Indeed, it would be impossible to design any
statute that could effectively make such distinctions, not to mention
keep those distinctions up-to-date as technology (and our relationship
to technology) evolves.
To see how these fine distinctions might apply in an actual prose-
cution, consider the recent case of United States v. Lowson.71 The de-
fendants in this case ran a service called Wiseguys which purchased
blocks of tickets from online vendors such as Ticketmaster and then
resold them on its own website.72 The government charged the de-
fendants with multiple counts of violating § 1030(a)(2) of the CFAA,
alleging that the defendants gained "unauthorized access" to the Tick-
etmaster site to purchase the tickets.73 According to the indictment,
the defendants conducted the following actions in order to buy their
blocks of tickets:
(1) Violated Ticketmaster's terms of service for its website which
prohibits using computer programs to purchase blocks of tickets;74
(2) Circumvented "proof of work" protections on the Tick-
etmaster site which are designed to prohibit spam, denial of service
attacks, and other mass-produced requests of the site by requiring the
requesting computer to do some amount of work before accessing the
site;75
(3) Wrote automated software and special optical character rec-
ognition programs to defeat the CAPTCHA challenges on the Tick-
etmaster site which are designed to ensure that actual human beings
are inputting information;7 6
69 Id. at [18]
70 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). The CFAA does distinguish between some of the
broadest types of behavior in Kugler's survey. For example, the survey differentiated between
using a web crawler that did not interfere with the operation of the target website and using a
web crawler that intentionally damaged the site's operation. See Kugler, supra note 66. The
CFAA reflects this distinction by creating different levels of liability based on whether the unau-
thorized access causes damage. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (a)(5), (c).
71 United States v. Lowson, No. 10-114 (KSH), 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010).
72 Id. at *1-*2.
73 Id. at *4-*5.
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(4) Used thousands of nonconsecutive internet protocol ("IP")
addresses o the Ticketmaster software could not detect that the sales
were all going to the same company;77 and
(5) Hacked into Ticketmaster's purchase ticketing program to
enable Wiseguys's automated programs to purchase tickets.78
The district court judge in the case had the unenviable job of de-
ciding which of these actions by the defendants counted as "unautho-
rized access" of the Ticketmaster website.79 Of these actions, the first
is merely a "contract-based" violation which should probably be dealt
with through civil lawsuits, and the fifth is a "code-based" violation
which certainly constitutes criminal "unauthorized access." The sec-
ond, third, and fourth raise some more complicated questions. If the
defendants used special software to gain access to the site more fre-
quently than an ordinary person could without such software, does
this become a "code-based" violation or merely a more egregious
"contract-based" violation? How sophisticated does the software
have to be to rise to the level of "unauthorized access"? And, if the
defendants merely hired a hundred employees to buy tickets all at
once in the usual method, would that still count as "unauthorized
access"?
But two other questions are even more troubling. First, how is a
court meant to decide this case using nothing more than the minimal
definitions in the CFAA and the conflicting caselaw from various cir-
cuit courts, almost all of which involve slightly different actions on the
part of the defendant? And second, is it appropriate to treat all of
these actions the same way? The CFAA makes no distinction be-
tween these different types of intrusions which are all covered under
the same unauthorized access provision.0
An administrative agency, by contrast, would be able to list spe-
cific actions that constitute "unauthorized access," and then update
the list as new forms of gaining access to websites arise. Furthermore,
the agency could set (and adjust) punishments for different levels of
77 Id. at *2.
78 Id. at *5.
79 Id. at *6.
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012). Another question which must be asked is one
which this Article discussed earlier: whether there even needs to be special computer crime
liability in this case. The defendants were also charged with seventeen different counts of wire
fraud for these same actions because they not only gained access to the Ticketmaster accounts,
but did so with the intent to defraud Ticketmaster. Lowson, 2010 WL 9552416, at *2. Given
these charges, it is not clear why there was a need to also charge the defendants with twenty-five
additional counts of unauthorized access under the CFAA. See id. at *5-*6.
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unauthorized access. Thus, courts, prosecutors, and potential defend-
ants would not have to guess whether certain conduct is prohibited,
and those who do violate the regulations would receive a punishment
more closely tailored to their level of wrongdoing.
Another benefit to this proposal is that an administrative agency
overseeing issues of computer misuse could also serve in an advisory
capacity for other agencies in the executive branch who have to deal
with the growing economic and social impact of computers and
software in the United States. As Professors Paul Ohm and Blake
Reid argue in this Symposium, there are many administrative agencies
in the executive branch that started out as regulators of machines,
chemicals, or medicine, but which are now struggling with the regula-
tion of computers and software.81 The Federal Drug Administration
must now regulate robotic surgical instruments,82 the Department of
Transportation must deal with autonomous driving cars,83 and nearly
every agency that regulates. consumer products must now come to
terms with the "internet of things" as more and more products are run
by software, connected to the Internet, and thus subject to hacking.84
Because existing agencies may lack the expertise to optimally regulate
their field in this new environment, an agency regulating computer
misuse could provide much needed guidance.
Professor Ryan Calo has made a similar argument in his recent
proposal for a Federal Robotics Commission-a new federal agency
that could channel government research dollars, convene stakeholders
on the growing field of robotics, and advise other agencies as they deal
with the growing influence of robots in society.85 Calo notes that new
technologies have frequently generated a need for new administrative
agencies: For example, the invention of the radio spurred the creation
of the Federal Radio Commission and ultimately the Federal Commu-
nications Commission, and the introduction of vaccines led to the cre-
ation of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.86 Calo also
81 See Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1672, 1673 (2016).
82 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMirN., DIsCUSSION PAPER: ROBOTICALLY-AsSISTED SURGI-
CAL DEVICES (2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/Workshops
Conferences/UCM454811.pdf.
83 See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT/NHTSA POLICY STATEMENT CONCERNING AUTro-
MATED VEHICLES (2016).
84 See Ohm & Reid, supra note 81, at 1673.
85 RYAN CALO, THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL ROBOTICS COMMISSION 11-12 (2014).
86 Id. at 3. Professor Calo also gives the examples of railroads and cars necessitating the
creation of the Department of Transportation, and of airplanes leading to the creation of the
Federal Aviation Administration. Id.
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notes numerous examples of federal agencies (who lack the expertise
in robotics) doing a poor job of responding to new technology, includ-
ing the Federal Aviation Administration's clumsy efforts at regulating
drones and the SEC's inability to properly deal with high-speed trad-
ing finance algorithms.87 Similarly, neither Congress nor the various
existing agencies have the expertise to deal with the myriad ways in
which computer "damage," "trespass," and other forms of computer
misuse impact society.
One objection to turning over the regulation of computer misuse
to an administrative agency is that the executive branch would assume
the primary rulemaking authority for computer crimes. Some have
argued that the executive branch, in the form of federal prosecutors,
has abused its authority under the CFAA.88 An administrative agency
empowered to create specific rules for terms such as "access" and "au-
thorization" might create broad definitions that would codify existing
prosecutorial practices, or perhaps even permit a greater range of
prosecutions. Even worse, these broad definitions would be entitled
to Chevron89 deference by the courts, making judges even more reluc-
tant to limit prosecutorial overreach.
There are two responses to this objection. One is that a central-
ized administrative agency tasked with creating these regulations
(even one located in the Department of Justice itself) would be more
inclined to implement moderate and narrow rules than individual fed-
eral prosecutor's offices. 0 As Professor Dan Kahan has argued, shift-
ing from the de facto rulemaking authority of local United States
Attorneys to the actual centralized rulemaking power of the Depart-
ment of Justice can help reign in prosecutorial abuse because
"[d]istant and largely invisible bureaucrats within the Justice Depart-
ment lack the incentives that individual U.S. Attorneys have to bend
the law to serve purely local interests."91
87 Id. at 8-9.
88 See Thaw, supra note 49, at 921-23, 944-45; see also, e.g., United States v. Swartz, 945 F.
Supp. 2d 216, 217-18 (D. Mass. 2013) (charging Aaron Swartz, a computer programmer, with
two counts of wire fraud and eleven violations of the CFAA after he broke into a closet at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to install a device to download academic journal articles
from JSTOR, a subscription-only database); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D.
Cal. 2009) (charging Lori Drew under the CFAA after she created a fictitious MySpace account
allegedly belonging to a sixteen-year-old boy in order to gain the trust of and then harass a
former friend of her teenage daughter).
89 Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
90 Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant o Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REv. 469,
498 (1996).
91 Id. at 497 (arguing that "[b]ecause the [Justice] Department, through the President, is
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Second, assigning rulemaking authority to an administrative
agency would actually make the process more responsive and trans-
parent. Administrative procedures call for significant notice-and-
comment periods during which various interests groups can evaluate
and provide feedback on the proposed rules," making it easier for
these interest groups to affect the rulings of an agency than it would
be to lobby Congress for changes in a statute. And unlike today,
when the meaning of "unauthorized access" may vary between federal
districts and depend on the individual decision of a United States At-
torney or district court judge, the specific definitions of each rule will
be clearly defined for the entire country.
CONCLUSION
Whenever a legislature creates a technology-specific crime, it
faces a number of challenges. First, there is a risk that the new statute
will merely duplicate existing crimes, thus over criminalizing the con-
duct and creating unnecessary confusion. Second, the legislature
needs to ensure that it provides the proper guidance to prosecutors,
citizens, and courts regarding the new concepts in the criminal statute.
And finally, the legislature needs to ensure that the law can be
amended and updated as the technology evolves.
The CFAA is an example of a technology-specific criminal statute
that fails all of these tests. Much of the CFAA is comprised of extor-
tion, fraud, and theft provisions which prohibit conduct already cov-
ered by existing laws (or could be covered through minor changes to
those laws). Meanwhile, the critical concepts of "loss," "access," and
"authorization" still remain poorly defined or completely undefined
by the statute thirty years after it was first passed. This failure of Con-
gress has made the unique provisions in the CFAA prohibiting com-
puter "damage" and "trespass" ineffective as courts are left to enforce
them without clear guidance.
The best solution to this problem is for Congress to stop trying to
regulate computer misuse directly through legislation, and instead em-
power an administrative agency to set more detailed and technical
rules regarding what constitutes "computer misuse." Thirty years of
accountable to the national electorate, it is more likely to be responsive to interests hurt by
adventurous readings, particularly readings that discourage socially desirable market activities").
92 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). The Administrative Procedure Act requires notice of pro-
posed rulemaking in the Federal Register and an opportunity for interested persons to "partici-
pate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation." Id. § 553(b)-(c).
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the CFAA have demonstrated that Congress lacks the expertise or
inclination to define the relatively new concept of "computer misuse,"
and the challenge is only becoming greater as the types of digital de-
vices, and the ways of communicating with them, increase every year.
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